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author | Bryan Newbold <bnewbold@robocracy.org> | 2018-04-18 17:35:24 -0700 |
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committer | Bryan Newbold <bnewbold@robocracy.org> | 2018-04-18 17:35:24 -0700 |
commit | 0f6294fb18cad09dab2ac7fc101dfbaeb3f40773 (patch) | |
tree | a09a991cc1e7a119895f35c9523a2de1e7caa75a /proposals | |
parent | 2cffaa1c5b5215a83558647a0658aa691428d127 (diff) | |
download | dat-deps-0f6294fb18cad09dab2ac7fc101dfbaeb3f40773.tar.gz dat-deps-0f6294fb18cad09dab2ac7fc101dfbaeb3f40773.zip |
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Diffstat (limited to 'proposals')
-rw-r--r-- | proposals/0000-hyperdb.md | 30 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/proposals/0000-hyperdb.md b/proposals/0000-hyperdb.md index 6fd1872..89ba2c8 100644 --- a/proposals/0000-hyperdb.md +++ b/proposals/0000-hyperdb.md @@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ Authors: Hyperdb is an abstraction layer providing a general purpose distributed key/value store over the hypercore protocol. It is an iteration on the hyperdrive directory tree implementation, building on top of the hypercore -append-only log abstraction layer. Keys are path-like strings (eg, +append-only log abstraction layer. Keys are path-like strings (e.g., `/food/fruit/kiwi`), and values are arbitrary binary blobs (generally under a megabyte). Hyperdrive (used by the Dat application) is expected to be re-implemented on -top of hyperdb for improved performance with many files (eg, millions). The +top of hyperdb for improved performance with many files (e.g., millions). The hyperdrive API should be largely unchanged, but the `metadata` format will be backwards-incompatible. @@ -71,13 +71,13 @@ A Hyperdb database instance can be represented by a single hypercore feed (or several feeds in a multi-writer context), and is named, referenced, and discovered using the public and discovery keys of the hypercore feed (or the original feed if there are several). In a single-writer configuration, only a -single node (holding the secret key) can mutate the database (eg, via `put` or +single node (holding the secret key) can mutate the database (e.g., via `put` or `delete` actions). **Keys** can be any UTF-8 string. Path segments are separated by the forward slash character (`/`). Repeated slashes (`//`) are disallowed. Leading and trailing `/` are optional in application code: `/hello` and `hello` are -equivalent. A key can be both a "path segment" and key at the same time; eg, +equivalent. A key can be both a "path segment" and key at the same time; e.g., `/a/b/c` and `/a/b` can both be keys at the same time. **Values** can be any binary blob, including empty (of zero length). For @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ creating a new one. A handle could represent any specific revision in history, or the "latest" revision. `db.put(key, value)`: inserts `value` (arbitrary bytes) under the path `key`. -Requires read-write access. Returns an error (eg, via callback) if there was a +Requires read-write access. Returns an error (e.g., via callback) if there was a problem. `db.get(key)`: Reading a non-existent `key` is an error. Read-only. @@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ feed, with `feeds` containing a single entry (a pointer to the current feed itself), and `contendFeed` optionally set to a pointer to a paired contend feed. -If *either* `feeds` *or* `contentFeed` are definined in an entry, *both* fields -must be defined, so the new message can be refered to via `inflated`. In this -case the entry is refered to as an "inflated entry". +If *either* `feeds` *or* `contentFeed` are defined in an entry, *both* fields +must be defined, so the new message can be referred to via `inflated`. In this +case the entry is refereed to as an "inflated entry". ## Path Hashing @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ case the entry is refered to as an "inflated entry". Every key path has component-wise fixed-size hash representation that is used by the trie. The concatenation of all path hashes yields a "path hash array" -for the entire key. Note that analagously to a hash map data structure, there +for the entire key. Note that analogously to a hash map data structure, there can be more than one key (string) with the same key hash in the same database with no problems: the hash points to a linked-list "bucket" of Entries, which can be iterated over linearly to find the correct value. @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ As another example, the key `/a/b/c` converts into the 97-byte hash array: Note that "hash collisions" are rare with this hashing scheme, but are likely to occur with large databases (millions of keys), and collision have been -generated as a proof of concept. Implementions should take care to properly +generated as a proof of concept. Implementations should take care to properly handle collisions by verifying keys and following bucket pointers (see the next section). @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ the second bytestring chunk would be: - second pointer is (`feed=1 << 1 | 0`, `index=17`) or (varint 2, varint 17); note the `more` bit is low, as usual. In the extremely unlikely case of multiple collisions there could have been more pointers with `more` high - preceeding this one. + preceding this one. The overall bytestring would be: @@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ The path hash array for this Entry (key) is: A backwards-incompatible change will have negative effects on the broader dat ecosystem: clients will need to support both versions protocol for some time -(increasing maintenance burden), future clients may not interoperate with old +(increasing maintenance burden), future clients may not inter-operate with old archives, etc. These downsides can partially be avoided by careful roll-out. For the specific use case of Dat archives, hyperdb will trivially increase @@ -663,12 +663,12 @@ when compared with, e.g., storing binary values at key-like paths using the current ("legacy") hyperdrive system. A malicious writer could cause trouble for readers, even readers who do not -trust the application-level contents of a feed. Implementions which may be +trust the application-level contents of a feed. Implementations which may be exposed to arbitrary feeds from unknown sources on the internet should take care to the following scenarios: A malicious writer may be able to produce very frequent key path hash collisions, which could degrade to linear performance. A malicious writer could send broken trie structures that contain pointer loops, -duplicate pointers, or other invalid contents. A malicous writer could write +duplicate pointers, or other invalid contents. A malicious writer could write arbitrary data in value fields in an attempt to exploit de-serialization bugs. A malicious writer could leverage non-printing unicode characters to create database entries with user-indistinguishable names (keys). @@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ happen after Draft status. There are implied "reasonable" limits on the size (in bytes) of both keys and values, but they are not formally specified. Protobuf messages have a hard -specified limit of 2 GByte (due to 32-bit signed arthimetic), and most +specified limit of 2 GByte (due to 32-bit signed arithmetic), and most implementations impose a (configurable) 64 MByte limit. Should this DEP impose specific limits on key and value sizes? Would be good to decide before Draft status. |