From 0a442d05cf994cd3ad3b107964feec1ffccef0b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gustavo Zacarias Date: Sat, 11 May 2013 03:58:25 +0000 Subject: libcurl: add security patch for CVE-2013-1944 Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++ package/libcurl/libcurl-cve-2013-0249.patch | 65 -------------------------- 3 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) create mode 100644 package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch create mode 100644 package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch delete mode 100644 package/libcurl/libcurl-cve-2013-0249.patch diff --git a/package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch b/package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7d2af2ac8 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libcurl/libcurl-01-CVE-2013-0249.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From ee45a34907ffeb5fd95b0513040d8491d565b663 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eldar Zaitov +Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2013 23:22:27 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message: fix buffer overflow + +When negotiating SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication, the function +Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message() uses the data provided from the +server without doing the proper length checks and that data is then +appended to a local fixed-size buffer on the stack. + +This vulnerability can be exploited by someone who is in control of a +server that a libcurl based program is accessing with POP3, SMTP or +IMAP. For applications that accept user provided URLs, it is also +thinkable that a malicious user would feed an application with a URL to +a server hosting code targetting this flaw. + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130206.html +--- + lib/curl_sasl.c | 23 ++++++----------------- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/curl_sasl.c b/lib/curl_sasl.c +index 57116b6..d07387d 100644 +--- a/lib/curl_sasl.c ++++ b/lib/curl_sasl.c +@@ -346,9 +346,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data, + snprintf(&HA1_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]); + + /* Prepare the URL string */ +- strcpy(uri, service); +- strcat(uri, "/"); +- strcat(uri, realm); ++ snprintf(uri, sizeof(uri), "%s/%s", service, realm); + + /* Calculate H(A2) */ + ctxt = Curl_MD5_init(Curl_DIGEST_MD5); +@@ -392,20 +390,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data, + for(i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LEN; i++) + snprintf(&resp_hash_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]); + +- strcpy(response, "username=\""); +- strcat(response, userp); +- strcat(response, "\",realm=\""); +- strcat(response, realm); +- strcat(response, "\",nonce=\""); +- strcat(response, nonce); +- strcat(response, "\",cnonce=\""); +- strcat(response, cnonce); +- strcat(response, "\",nc="); +- strcat(response, nonceCount); +- strcat(response, ",digest-uri=\""); +- strcat(response, uri); +- strcat(response, "\",response="); +- strcat(response, resp_hash_hex); ++ snprintf(response, sizeof(response), ++ "username=\"%s\",realm=\"%s\",nonce=\"%s\"," ++ "cnonce=\"%s\",nc=\"%s\",digest-uri=\"%s\",response=%s", ++ userp, realm, nonce, ++ cnonce, nonceCount, uri, resp_hash_hex); + + /* Base64 encode the reply */ + return Curl_base64_encode(data, response, 0, outptr, outlen); +-- +1.7.10.4 + diff --git a/package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch b/package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..18d9c2d39 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libcurl/libcurl-02-CVE-2013-1944.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 3604fde3d3c9b0d0e389e079aecf470d123ba180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: YAMADA Yasuharu +Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:17:15 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage + +Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl +to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name). + +This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944. + +Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html +--- + lib/cookie.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c +index 4b9ec0b..a67204e 100644 +--- a/lib/cookie.c ++++ b/lib/cookie.c +@@ -118,15 +118,29 @@ static void freecookie(struct Cookie *co) + free(co); + } + +-static bool tailmatch(const char *little, const char *bigone) ++static bool tailmatch(const char *cooke_domain, const char *hostname) + { +- size_t littlelen = strlen(little); +- size_t biglen = strlen(bigone); ++ size_t cookie_domain_len = strlen(cooke_domain); ++ size_t hostname_len = strlen(hostname); + +- if(littlelen > biglen) ++ if(hostname_len < cookie_domain_len) + return FALSE; + +- return Curl_raw_equal(little, bigone+biglen-littlelen) ? TRUE : FALSE; ++ if(!Curl_raw_equal(cooke_domain, hostname+hostname_len-cookie_domain_len)) ++ return FALSE; ++ ++ /* A lead char of cookie_domain is not '.'. ++ RFC6265 4.1.2.3. The Domain Attribute says: ++ For example, if the value of the Domain attribute is ++ "example.com", the user agent will include the cookie in the Cookie ++ header when making HTTP requests to example.com, www.example.com, and ++ www.corp.example.com. ++ */ ++ if(hostname_len == cookie_domain_len) ++ return TRUE; ++ if('.' == *(hostname + hostname_len - cookie_domain_len - 1)) ++ return TRUE; ++ return FALSE; + } + + /* +-- +1.7.10.4 + diff --git a/package/libcurl/libcurl-cve-2013-0249.patch b/package/libcurl/libcurl-cve-2013-0249.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7d2af2ac8..000000000 --- a/package/libcurl/libcurl-cve-2013-0249.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -From ee45a34907ffeb5fd95b0513040d8491d565b663 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Eldar Zaitov -Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2013 23:22:27 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message: fix buffer overflow - -When negotiating SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication, the function -Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message() uses the data provided from the -server without doing the proper length checks and that data is then -appended to a local fixed-size buffer on the stack. - -This vulnerability can be exploited by someone who is in control of a -server that a libcurl based program is accessing with POP3, SMTP or -IMAP. For applications that accept user provided URLs, it is also -thinkable that a malicious user would feed an application with a URL to -a server hosting code targetting this flaw. - -Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130206.html ---- - lib/curl_sasl.c | 23 ++++++----------------- - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/curl_sasl.c b/lib/curl_sasl.c -index 57116b6..d07387d 100644 ---- a/lib/curl_sasl.c -+++ b/lib/curl_sasl.c -@@ -346,9 +346,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data, - snprintf(&HA1_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]); - - /* Prepare the URL string */ -- strcpy(uri, service); -- strcat(uri, "/"); -- strcat(uri, realm); -+ snprintf(uri, sizeof(uri), "%s/%s", service, realm); - - /* Calculate H(A2) */ - ctxt = Curl_MD5_init(Curl_DIGEST_MD5); -@@ -392,20 +390,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data, - for(i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LEN; i++) - snprintf(&resp_hash_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]); - -- strcpy(response, "username=\""); -- strcat(response, userp); -- strcat(response, "\",realm=\""); -- strcat(response, realm); -- strcat(response, "\",nonce=\""); -- strcat(response, nonce); -- strcat(response, "\",cnonce=\""); -- strcat(response, cnonce); -- strcat(response, "\",nc="); -- strcat(response, nonceCount); -- strcat(response, ",digest-uri=\""); -- strcat(response, uri); -- strcat(response, "\",response="); -- strcat(response, resp_hash_hex); -+ snprintf(response, sizeof(response), -+ "username=\"%s\",realm=\"%s\",nonce=\"%s\"," -+ "cnonce=\"%s\",nc=\"%s\",digest-uri=\"%s\",response=%s", -+ userp, realm, nonce, -+ cnonce, nonceCount, uri, resp_hash_hex); - - /* Base64 encode the reply */ - return Curl_base64_encode(data, response, 0, outptr, outlen); --- -1.7.10.4 - -- cgit v1.2.3